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Payments for ecosystem services should be informed by how both the providing-resource 
and the downstream resource are managed. We develop an integrated model that jointly 
optimizes conservation investment in a watershed that recharges a downstream aquifer 
and groundwater extraction from the aquifer. Volumetric user-fees to finance watershed 
investment induce inefficient water use, inasmuch as conservation projects actually lower 
the optimal price of groundwater. We propose a lump-sum conservation surcharge that 
preserves efficient incentives and fully finances conservation investment. Inasmuch as 
proper watershed management counteracts the negative effects of water scarcity, it also 
serves as adaptation to climate change. When recharge is declining, the excess burden of 
non-optimal watershed management increases. 
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Resource economists often recommend that water utilities price according to 
marginal cost in order to induce demand-side conservation. These studies typically take 
groundwater inflow or recharge as constant (e.g. Gisser and Sanchez, 1980; Feinerman 
and Knapp, 1983; Koundouri, 2004; Pitafi and Roumasset, 2009). However, the quality 
of watersheds in many regions is in decline due to urban development, invasive species, 
logging, or other activities that use the watershed, and climate change may exacerbate (or 
ameliorate) the problem (World Bank, 2004; WWAP, 2009). Consequently, groundwater 
recharge has been declining in recent years and will continue to do so in the absence of 
corrective measures. A comprehensive groundwater management program which 
integrates optimal investment in watershed conservation capital (e.g. fencing for feral 
ungulates, reforestation, and infiltration-enhancing engineering structures) provides 
adaptation to declining recharge levels. 
Determining the optimal time path of investment in conservation capital requires 
solving a dynamic problem with multiple control variables and two connected stocks. 
Pumping subtracts from the groundwater stock directly, and investing in the watershed 
has a positive effect on the groundwater stock through its impact on aquifer recharge. The 
objective is to choose extraction and investment simultaneously in every time period to 
maximize the present value of net social benefits. Inasmuch as watershed conservation is 
costly, there exists a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of investment, part of which 
is represented by the impact on the groundwater resource. Although the analysis focuses 
on water consumption benefits, other benefits from conservation include, for example, 
recreation, increased biodiversity, reduced sedimentation, and reduced flooding.  
Several recent studies focusing on Hawai‘i have considered the relationship 
between groundwater aquifers and their associated watersheds, but none have done so in 
a fully optimal framework. Kaiser and Roumasset (2002) set up a model with 
conservation expenditures as a control variable but then proceed with a benefit cost 
analysis for a particular watershed deterioration scenario, i.e. a given reduction in 
recharge. Pitafi and Roumasset (2006) show that watershed conservation reforms may 
fail a cost-benefit test if groundwater management reforms are not implemented 
simultaneously, but the calculations are also based on various recharge-loss scenarios. 
Neither study examines finance options for provision of the ecosystem services. 
More generally, the problem of investing in one resource to increase the growth of 
an interrelated resource has been examined in the context of coastal wetlands and 
offshore fisheries (Barbier, 2008). In Thailand, mangrove ecosystems serve as both 
nurseries and breeding grounds for fish. However, incentives exist for converting 
mangrove areas to shrimp farms, and when the shrimp farms are eventually abandoned, 
the ecosystem is unable to revert back to its original state without additional investment 
efforts, i.e. investment in mangrove rehabilitation has a direct and positive impact on 
offshore fishery growth. 
The use of payments as a tool to induce provision of ecosystem services (PES) 
has increased in recent years. In a comparative analysis of PES programs, Wunder et al. 
(2008) observe substantial differences across countries, reflecting ecological, 
socioeconomic, institutional, or political circumstances, and in some cases simply poorly 
designed programs. They find that user-financed programs are generally more efficient than government-financed programs. That is, user-financed programs tend to be better 
designed to match local conditions and needs, have superior monitoring and enforcement, 
and are better targeted. Although PES programs have experienced growing popularity in 
recent years, they often lack “careful analysis of how [they] work, and of [their] strengths 
and weaknesses” (Wunder et al., 2008). Thus, further analytical work in this area would 
contribute to a better understanding of current PES programs and inform the design of 
future programs.  
In this paper, we develop and solve a model that jointly optimizes groundwater 
extraction from a costal aquifer and investment in watershed conservation over time, 
focusing on the recharge-benefits of conservation. Although the derived efficiency price 
equation is identical to the optimality condition when groundwater is optimized 
exclusively, the actual price paths differ inasmuch as they are dependent on the head and 
capital stock trajectories corresponding to their respective watershed management 
decisions. In addition to a Hotelling condition for governing extraction of the renewable 
groundwater resource, the joint optimization model also yields an equimarginality 
condition for the capital stock, reminiscent of Jorgensen (1963). Groundwater should be 
priced at its marginal opportunity cost (marginal extraction cost plus marginal user cost), 
and capital should be accumulated until its marginal value is equal to its implicit rental 
price. 
We also demonstrate that a lump-sum conservation surcharge can simultaneously 
preserve efficient incentives and finance the optimal pattern of investment. In the context 
of public utilities, conservation surcharges are generally understood to be volumetric, 
since their purpose is to induce demand-side conservation by making high volume users responsible for capacity expansion costs. We show, however, that first-best finance of 
investment in watershed conservation calls for lump-sum surcharges, albeit 
individualized according to potential benefits. A related problem is that water utilities are 
constitutionally constrained to recover the costs of extraction and distribution 
infrastructure but are not empowered to conserve the watershed, which is the province of 
another jurisdiction. Nature's infrastructure for delivering recharge requires maintenance, 
however, just as wells and pipes do. Thus, implementing surcharges may require enabling 
legislation to facilitate the described principles of public finance. 
Lastly, we characterize the resource management implications of climate change. 
Enhancing groundwater recharge through investment depresses the shadow price of 
groundwater, and hence increases welfare. The need for investment is therefore amplified 
by declining recharge. For lower rates of recharge, the excess burden of ignoring the 
watershed increases, even if groundwater extraction is optimized independently. 
2 The dynamic economic-hydrologic optimization model 
In this section, we characterize and develop solutions to the problem of jointly 
managing a watershed and a groundwater aquifer in the absence of climate change. 
Section 4 extends the framework to allow for declining recharge, thus treating watershed 
management as climate adaptation. 
2.1 Description of the system 
When demand for water is growing over time, groundwater must eventually be 
supplemented by other (non-traditional) water sources. Desalinated seawater (b) serves 
as a natural backstop resource in the case of a coastal aquifer. A water manager, 
therefore, has the choice of obtaining water from the aquifer and/or from desalination in any given period. The volume of groundwater stored in a coastal aquifer depends on the 
aquifer boundaries, lens geometry, and rock porosity (Mink, 1980). We assume the 
hydraulic gradient is small enough that the head level (h), or the vertical distance 
between mean sea level and the top of the freshwater lens, is approximately proportional 
to the stored volume of groundwater, i.e. we abstract from the true parabolic shape of the 
lens. Following Krulce et al. (1997), the head level trajectory is governed by natural 
recharge (R ), leakage ( L), and extraction (q) 
As the head level declines, the distance groundwater must be lifted increases and 
consequently extraction cost rises, i.e.  0 ) ( < ′ t q h c . Since the model considers a coastal 
aquifer, wells nearest the coast face salt water intrusion soonest as the lens of freshwater 
shrinks over time due to extraction. Costs may eventually rise drastically as remaining 
wells reach capacity constraints and costly new wells must be drilled to meet demand. 
This possibility is modeled by allowing the cost function to be convex in head, i.e. 
0 ) ( ≥ ′ ′ t q h c .
1 Leakage is also a function of head when low permeability sediment deposits 
bound the freshwater lens along the coast. Pressure from the lens causes some freshwater 
to discharge via coastal springs or subterraneously into the ocean. As the aquifer head 
declines, leakage decreases both because of the smaller surface area along the ocean 
boundary and because of the decrease in pressure due to the shrinking of the lens. Thus 
0 ) ( > ′ t h L  and  0 ) ( ≥ ′ ′ t h L . 
                                                 
1 It may be that for political or other reasons, all wells must be protected from saltwater intrusion.  In that 
case, new wells still may be drilled, which would increase the costs non-linearly.  However, the assumption 
of non-strict rather than strict convexity includes the possibility of linear extraction costs. If the current 
infrastructure is sufficient to meet future demand, then the physical cost of withdrawal is determined 
entirely by the energy costs required to lift the water. Natural recharge is an increasing and concave function of capital stock, i.e. 
0 / > ∂ ∂ t N R  and  0 /
2 2 < ∂ ∂ t N R . In addition, we assume that the recharge function 
satisfies the Inada conditions, i.e.  ∞ = ′
→ ) ( lim
0 t N N R
t
 and  0 ) ( lim = ′
∞ → t N N R
t
. If investment 
expenditures are optimally allocated amongst available conservation instruments, then it 
follows that the first units of capital are most effective at enhancing recharge and that the 
marginal product of capital eventually tapers off. 
Although conservation capital (N ) is treated as a single stock in the discussion 
that follows, in reality, there are a plethora of available recharge-augmenting instruments 
such as fencing for feral pigs, which prevents the destruction of upland vegetation; 
reforestation of native flora, which can decrease evapotranspiration and surface runoff; 
and manmade engineering structures designed to increase infiltration and/or decrease 
runoff. Optimal watershed management therefore involves selecting a portfolio of 
instruments that maximizes recharge benefits net of investment costs.
2 Inasmuch as we 
are interested primarily in the impact of investment (I ) on aquifer-level groundwater 
extraction trajectories, we assume that all expenditures are allocated optimally amongst 
available conservation instruments. Investment enters the resource manager’s problem as 
a control variable. Capital stock depreciates at an exogenous rate (δ ), but the resource 
manager can steer the time path of capital stock, and hence recharge, by choosing the 
expenditure on investment in every period. The integrated watershed-aquifer system is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
2 In this analysis, we focus on the groundwater recharge benefits of watershed conservation. In general, 
benefits would include other ecosystem services such reduced flooding, reduced sedimentation, 
biodiversity, and recreation.  
Figure 1: Coastal watershed-aquifer system 
2.2 Resource manager’s maximization problem 
The resource manager must choose the rates of extraction  ) ( t q , desalination  ) ( t b , 
and investment  ) ( t I  in every period, given a discount rate  0 > r  to maximize the net 
present value of social welfare: 
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and standard non-negativity constraints on the control variables. Gross benefits from 
water consumption are measured as the area under the inverse demand curve (
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Investment desalination ( b c ), the unit distribution cost ( d c ) and the unit cost of investment ( I c ). 
Since the right-hand side of the aquifer’s governing equation is measured in water 
volume, the change in head level must be converted using a height-to-volume conversion 
factor (γ ). Investment is bounded below by zero and above by  max I , which denotes some 
maximum feasible investment rate, determined for example, by budgetary restrictions. 
  Along the optimal trajectory, groundwater must be extracted until its marginal 
benefit is equal to its marginal cost. The efficiency price of water, therefore, is 
determined where the equimarginality condition is satisfied, and we define it as 
) (
1
t t t b q D p + ≡
− . More specifically, the necessary condition
3 for optimal groundwater 
extraction requires that royalty (price minus extraction cost) is equal to the shadow price 
of water ( t λ ) or marginal user cost plus distribution cost. Equivalently, the efficiency 
price is equal to the marginal opportunity cost (MOC) of groundwater, or the sum of 
marginal extraction, distribution and marginal user costs. The condition is none other 
than a modified
4 version of the Hotelling rule for the optimal extraction of a natural 
resource. 
  The adjoint equation or the equation of motion for the costate variable ( t λ ) can be 
rearranged as follows: 
(2)  ) ( ) (
1
t t t t t q t h L r q h c ′ + = ′ −
− λ γ λ λ & . 
Eq. 2 says that marginal benefit should be equated to the cost of the marginal conserved 
unit of groundwater.  The marginal benefit includes the increase in royalty and the 
decrease in extraction cost, while the marginal cost includes the forgone interest from the 
                                                 
3 See Appendix A for the current value Hamiltonian and the necessary conditions for the maximum 
principle. 
4 The basic Hotelling rule is extended to include stock-dependent extraction costs and resource growth. royalty and the lost value resulting from increased leakage. The costate variable is by 
definition the increase in net present value resulting from an additional unit of the 
groundwater stock. From a cost perspective, it is the loss in value when the stock is 
reduced by one unit, or the marginal user cost. We manipulate the necessary conditions to 
avoid dealing with the path of  t λ  explicitly, however, since focusing on the efficiency 
price allows one to characterize individual components comprising marginal user cost. 
For  0 > t q , it is straightforward to derive the following efficiency price equation:
5 
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The marginal user cost takes into account the forgone use of the marginal unit when price 
is higher in the future, the value of the resulting decrease in leakage, and the increase in 
marginal extraction cost. Eq. 3 remains unchanged when watershed conservation is not 
part of the resource management strategy, i.e. when  0 = t I  for all t. The actual price 
paths will differ, however, inasmuch as the trajectory of aquifer recharge is influenced by 
capital stock. For example, relative to the zero investment case, we expect the efficiency 
price of water under optimal investment to start lower and the aquifer to be utilized for a 
longer period of time before the switch to the backstop technology. 
The capital stock has an equimarginality condition similar to that for the stock of 
groundwater. For  I t c = µ , i.e. at the singular solution
6  * N , 
                                                 
5 To derive Eq. 3, take the time derivative of Eq. A2, substitute the result with Eq. A2 and A5 into Eq. 2, 
and rearrange. 
6 Singular solutions arise in problems where the Hamiltonian is linear in a control variable. When the 
switching function vanishes identically over some time interval, the maximum principle does not specify 
the value of the optimal control. Instead, the singular solution must be used to characterize the optimal 
value of the control variable (e.g. Conrad and Clark, 1987) (4)  ) ( ) ( )] ( [
1 δ γ + = ′ −
− r c N R h c p I t t q t . 
The marginal benefit is the value of the increase in recharge resulting from the marginal 
unit of conservation capital stock. The marginal cost can be thought of as the implicit 
rental price or user cost of capital (Jorgensen, 1963), which includes the forgone interest 
that would have accrued had the income not been spent on conservation capital, and the 
cost of depreciation. 
Since the current value Hamiltonian (Eq. A1) is linear in t I , investment is 
expected to follow a most rapid approach path (MRAP) to the steady state.  One can 
define a switching function using the coefficient of  t I : 
(5)  I t c t − ≡ µ σ ) ( . 
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The optimal investment rule is to choose the maximum feasible level of investment when 
the shadow value of capital stock exceeds the marginal cost of investment, and choose 
zero investment if the cost is instead higher than the shadow value. 
2.3 Characterization of the steady state 
To operationalize the investment rule, we rewrite Eq. 6 in terms of the singular 
solution for the capital stock ( * N ). Following Conrad and Clark (1987), we start by 
setting the coefficient of the relevant control in the Hamiltonian equal to zero, which 
amounts to setting Eq. 5 equal to zero. The result is then substituted into the adjoint 
equation for  t µ , which yields Eq. 4.  In the steady state or long-run equilibrium, 0 = = = t t t N h p & & & , and  b c p = * . Then the solution * N , which belongs to a vector 
*) *, *, ( N h p  that simultaneously satisfies Eqs. 3 and 4, is the singular solution for the 
capital stock.
7 



























If the level of capital stock is below its steady state level, the resource manager should 
invest at the maximum feasible rate in every period until * N  is reached.  If instead the 
capital stock starts off at a relatively high level, then one should optimally allow the 
capital stock to depreciate until the steady state level is obtained, at which point 
* * N I δ = . 
  Upon solving for the values of  * h  and  * N , one can also obtain the steady state 
values of groundwater extraction and desalination. Since  0 = t h &  in the steady state, the 
equation of motion for the aquifer head level (Eq. A5) implies that  *) ( *) ( * h L N R q − = . 
In other words, extraction should be constant and equal to recharge net of natural leakage. 
Any quantity demanded in excess of net recharge is therefore supplied by desalination, 
i.e.  * ) ( * q c c D b d b − + = . 
  It is clear that the capital stocks of both resources are intimately linked in the 
dynamic solution to the joint optimization problem (Eq. 1). The same holds true for the 
steady state. We consider Eq. 3 in order to study the comparative statics of the long-run 
equilibrium solution. One can show using the implicit function theorem that 
                                                 
7 We assume the existence of a unique steady state. Therefore, the singular solution coincides with the 
steady state capital stock. 0 / < ∂ ∂ T T R h  and  0 / > ∂ ∂ T T R q .
8 In other words, for a positive shock to the steady state 
recharge rate, the optimal long-run head level is lower and groundwater extraction is 
higher. The intuition is that a higher recharge rate means groundwater is less scarce, and 
consumption can be increased without decreasing the PV of net social benefits. The result 
is illustrated in Figure 2. Enhanced recharge resulting from investment effectively shifts 
the MOC for groundwater downward, which means the optimal quantity of groundwater 
extraction and consumption increases. 
 
Figure 2. Steady state implications for a positive shock to recharge 
  In addition, the recharge shock results in a decrease in the efficiency price, thus 
pushing the system out of equilibrium. A lower price means that the groundwater will be 
used exclusively, and costly desalination delayed even further, in transition to the new 
steady state. 
2.4 Transition to the steady state 
                                                 









R Eq. 3, the capital accumulation equation (Eq. A7), and the governing equation for 
head (Eq. A5) comprise a differential system that can be solved given proper boundary 
conditions for aquifer head level, conservation capital stock, and price.  Field 
measurements of the initial head level and information about status quo conservation 
measures are likely available in practice.  The steady state price is determined by the cost 
of the backstop when demand is growing over time, and the terminal values for both state 
variables can be determined as outlined in Section 2.3.  
Inasmuch as the Hamiltonian is linear in investment, the dynamic paths of capital 
stock and investment will approach monotonically from above or below the steady state 
target, depending on the initial value  0 N . The MRAP does not apply to the other 
variables, however. The Hamiltonian is non-linear in extraction, and consequently the 
optimal trajectories of price and head are not so straightforward to characterize. If the 
system of necessary conditions could be reduced to three variables, then methods for 
constructing 3-dimensional phase diagrams could be applied (e.g. Kamien and Schwartz, 
1991), although characterizing such a reduced system would still be a formidable task. 
We expect that non-monotonic trajectories of head can turn out to be optimal under 
certain circumstances, inasmuch as the result has been established for the case of constant 
aquifer recharge (e.g., Krulce et al., 1997). 
3 Financing watershed conservation 
One way to finance a comprehensive watershed conservation program is through 
benefit taxation. Groundwater consumers ultimately benefit from the enhanced recharge 
that watershed conservation provides through lower water prices and delayed 
implementation of costly desalination. With no economic objectives, a volumetric tax on groundwater consumption may seem ideal; it targets the beneficiaries, lowers 
consumption, and provides revenue to finance investment in recharge capacity. As 
illustrated in Figure 3, while optimal investment moderates water scarcity and shifts the 
MOC for groundwater downward, a volumetric tax (τ )  has the opposite effect on 
consumption. Charging consumers a higher price takes away part of the benefits of 
investment, exactly what we are trying to avoid. Moreover, from a welfare standpoint, 
volumetric charges put a disproportionately large burden of the investment costs on 
current generations, even though future generations benefit most from the program. A 
lump-sum tax can preserve efficient incentives as well as distribute project costs in 
accordance with benefits. 
 
Figure 3. Volumetric conservation surcharge 
3.1 Lump-sum watershed conservation surcharges 
  In the context of public utilities, a conservation surcharge is generally understood 












R design (see e.g. Mann and Clark, 1993). The charge is determined according to the 
avoided-cost principle. Demand-side conservation is induced by incorporating capacity 
expansion costs into the price for discretionary usage. This type of conservation 
surcharge may be roughly correct for electric utilities, however inasmuch as groundwater 
is a renewable resource, the optimal pricing structure for water should include marginal 
user cost. A lump-sum conservation surcharge appended to the efficiency price of 
groundwater is a means of financing investment in watershed conservation while 
accounting for the marginal user cost of groundwater. 
One approach to benefit taxation, and the one used in the lump-sum tax scheme 
detailed in the remainder of this section, is to set the costs of conservation investment 
proportional to the benefits. The idea of proportional benefit taxation is sometimes 
attributed to Wicksell (1958),
9 although technically the only requirement of Wicksell’s 
political model is unanimity, which guarantees Pareto-improvement
10 – some individuals 
must be made better off and nobody can be made worse off. Inasmuch as Wicksellian 
taxes can be anything less than benefits, as established by the political process, 
proportional benefit taxation can satisfy the criteria for Wicksellian taxation, but a 
Wickellian tax need not be proportional to benefits. In general, the cooperation induced 
by unanimity need not lead exactly to proportional benefit taxation. Other possibilities 
include concepts from cooperative game theory such as the Shapley value (Shapley, 
1953), as well as concepts from the theory of public goods such as Lindahl pricing (e.g., 
                                                 
9 See e.g., Backhaus and Wagner (2004) and Shughart and Razzolini (2003). 
10 The lump-sum tax ensures Pareto-improvement across generations, i.e., each generation t as a whole is 
made better off with the program, but not within generations. An instrument that leaves every single 
individual (within and across generations) better off would require a higher level of sophistication as well 
as more individualized information. See Pitafi and Roumasset (2009) for an application of (Pareto-
improving) proportional benefit taxation to finance pricing reform in a spatial and intertemporal context of 
groundwater management. Lindahl, 1919; Hines, 2000), according to which public good provision is supported by 
individual-specific prices set equal to marginal valuations.  
In anticipation of future scarcity, it is optimal in some cases to incur large 
investment costs at the outset, even though benefits may be concentrated further off into 
the future. If the project runs a deficit initially and a surplus later, a bond will be required, 
such that the present value of collections is equal to the present value of investment costs. 
Although we assume a representative consumer in every period, water users are 
differentiated across time by the benefits they receive. The benefit from water use 
obtained by a representative generation-t consumer when the aquifer and watershed are 
jointly optimized is calculated as: 
(9)  ∫
+
− + − + − =
t t b q
t d b t d t q t t t b c c q c h c dx x D V
ˆ ˆ
0
1 ˆ ] [ ˆ ] ) ˆ ( [ ) ( ˆ . 
Similarly, the generation-t benefit obtained by optimizing groundwater extraction, taking 
the status quo conservation as given
11 can be calculated as: 
(10)  ∫
+
− + − + − =
t t b q
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The period-t welfare gain from the conservation program is therefore  t t V V
~ ˆ − . 
In order to solve for the proportion of welfare gains that balances the 
intergenerational budget, it is also necessary to calculate the PV cost of investment: 





ˆ ˆ . 
 
                                                 
11 The benchmark could be measured in a variety of different ways.  For example, one could also consider 
the trajectory of capital stock for zero investment or require just maintenance for a chosen benchmark year. 
The methodology is applicable to whichever benchmark is most appropriate for the particular application. Since the present value of collections must be sufficient to cover the investment costs 
(Eq. 11), and the per-period tax is calculated as a proportion (α ) of the periodic welfare 
gain, the following condition must be satisfied: 
(12)  ∫
∞ − − =
0 )]
~ ˆ ( [ ˆ dt V V e C t t
rt α   ⇒  ∫
∞ − − =
0 )]
~ ˆ [( / ˆ ˆ dt V V e C t t
rt α . 
The efficient lump-sum tax for the representative generation-t consumer is: 
(13)  )
~ ˆ ( ˆ t t t V V − =α τ . 
  If one has reason to believe that the political process would yield a tax system that 
is not proportional, e.g. one in which certain generations bear a larger proportion of the 
costs, then the tax formula (Eq. 13) can be adjusted by replacing α ˆ  with  t α , where  t α  
varies between generations and is determined by the political process. Proportional 
benefit taxation is used in this analysis, however, because it is a defensible principle in 
the sense that it theoretically limits rent-seeking behavior. A group of beneficiaries 
cannot alter its relative tax share; an increase or decrease for one group means an increase 
or decrease for all. With a progressive tax structure, the degree of progression is open to 
rent-seeking. 
3.2 Conservation financing with negative beneficiaries 
  Proportional benefit taxation makes sense as long as  t t V V
~ ˆ >  for all t, i.e. 
consumers in every period gain from the watershed conservation plan. If there are 
negative beneficiaries, however, proportional payments (even if negative) may leave 
some consumers worse off. A Pareto-improving outcome can still be achieved with a 
slight modification of the previously discussed lump-sum tax program. The most 
straightforward way of doing so is to increase the proportional collection of benefit taxes from the winners (those consumers for which  t t V V
~ ˆ > ) in order to leave the losers (those 
consumers for which  t t V V
~ ˆ < ) just as well off as they were without the watershed 
management plan. The tax collection would be higher per household in this scenario, 
inasmuch as the winners must compensate the losers in addition to financing investment 
in conservation. 
3.3 Conservation financing under alternative property rights regimes 
  The model and discussion up until now have proceeded on the assumption that the 
watershed overlies publicly owned land that is protected for environmental and/or 
cultural reasons. In such cases, the government need not worry about private landowners, 
who may object to using the land for conservation purposes. If private landowners own 
the watershed, however, they likely already enjoy profits from other uses of the land, 
such as logging or agriculture. In this section, we consider how the analysis should be 
modified to incentivize private landowners to optimally conserve the watershed. 
  One possibility is for the government to pass a law mandating the landowner to 
conserve at least enough to maintain a percentage of the current level of recharge or some 
other benchmark. If the landowner conserves beyond the benchmark level, then he must 
be paid the value of additional recharge services yielded by the investment in 
conservation capital. If he fails to preserve at least the benchmark level of recharge, then 
the government charges him the value of the recharge lost. Such payments for ecosystem 
services can leave landowners better off than they otherwise would be if the payments 
exceed the sum of conservation investment costs and forgone profits from the most 
profitable alternative land use.   Alternatively, the government can pay the landowner just enough to make him 
exactly as well off as he was before the watershed program was implemented, while 
inducing the optimal level of conservation. In that scenario, the payment of the 
investment costs would still be proportional to the benefits, and accordingly each water 
user would still be made at least as well off as in the benchmark case. The solution would 
emulate the public case, except that private landowner would receive a transfer to leave 
him at least as well off, ensuring that the program is still Pareto-improving. 
Whether private landowners would be allowed to make a profit from ecosystem 
services or would be left only as well off as they were before implementation of the 
conservation program is a question we leave to the political process. In either case, the 
government would not need to finance the program if capital markets were perfect. 
Inasmuch as capital markets are not perfect, however, implementing such a conservation 
program would be greatly facilitated by a watershed partnership.   
3.4 Discussion 
  Investing in watershed conservation lowers the marginal user cost of groundwater 
and consequently the efficiency price. Volumetric user charges that increase the price of 
water thus impede efficiency. Lump-sum financing of investment, on the other hand, is 
win-win. Every generation of water users is better off after implementing and financing 
the conservation project than if groundwater is optimized without watershed 
conservation. The lump-sum tax structure is simple and transparent, yet preserves 
efficient incentives. A “watershed conservation tax” would appear as a separate charge 
on a typical user’s water bill, much as sewerage fees do in many localities. The fixed charge would be explained as representing a proportion of expected benefits from the 
watershed conservation plan.   
Whether the watershed conservation surcharges can be truly classified as “lump-
sum” depends on consumers’ elasticity with respect to the fixed fee. The analysis thus far 
has maintained the assumption that consumers are perfectly inelastic, but the literature on 
other types of public utilities suggests that this is not always necessarily the case. Rodini 
et al. (2003) find that mobile phone services exhibit some substitutability with telephone 
landlines, particularly with a second fixed line. In that example, an increase in the 
monthly fixed charge for a landline might induce a consumer to switch over to a mobile 
phone service. Such a fee increase, while not volumetric, is also not lump-sum, inasmuch 
as it affects the user’s landline consumption decision. Although there are few analogous 
alternatives for potable water, a conservation surcharge may affect things like household 
formation, thus making consumers less than perfectly inelastic.   
Implementing the watershed conservation tax would require enabling legislation 
for water utilities to change their principles of finance in localities such as Hawai‘i, 
where the utility is allowed to finance construction and maintenance of groundwater 
infrastructure but not for maintaining nature’s infrastructure for aquifer recharge. 
Inasmuch as investment costs are concentrated in the initial periods and benefits 
concentrated in future periods, financing a watershed conservation program requires 
borrowing. One way to borrow the requisite funds is a state-issued bond. Since the 
Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) has the authority to designate forest 
reserves for the protection of the state’s water resources, while the Honolulu Board of 
Water Supply (BWS) provides groundwater to most users on O‘ahu, the envisioned plan of finance would require interagency coordination. Legislation would be required to 
enable the HBWS to collect conservation surcharges from water users on behalf of the 
state. DLNR would ultimately carry out the watershed conservation project, while the 
state pays off the bond using the surcharges collected by HBWS. 
The problem becomes slightly more complicated, when multiple types of users 
are considered. The analysis thus far has proceeded on the assumption that each 
generation can be sufficiently characterized by a representative consumer. The benefit 
principle should still extend to various types of users, provided that welfare gains can be 
differentiated by user, i.e. there is sufficient information regarding the preferences or 
demand functions of every household. 
4 Watershed conservation as climate adaptation  
Available research indicates that climate change will affect groundwater recharge 
rates and levels in a multitude of ways, although the regional magnitude, and in some 
cases the direction, of such impacts remain uncertain (IPCC, 2007b). Climate change 
may lead to changes in vegetation, and hence evapotranspiration (ET), which affects 
recharge to groundwater aquifers. An increase in temperature would also affect ET and 
consequently recharge, inasmuch as more water would evaporate before having the 
opportunity to infiltrate back into the ground. In addition, increased ET and associated 
sea level rise lead to intrusion of saline water into coastal aquifers, reducing the usable 
portion of coastal groundwater resources. Climate change models predict a considerable 
future increase in heavy rainfall events in many areas, including Hawai‘i (IPCC, 2007a), in which wet-season mean rainfall may decline (Timm and Diaz, 2009).
12 A higher 
frequency of extreme events increases the risks of floods, adversely affects the quality of 
groundwater resources, and may negatively affect recharge depending on how much of 
the concentrated rainfall is lost as runoff. In many regions, aquifer recharge is likely to 
decrease (IPCC, 2007a) unless the quality of watersheds is improved. The analysis that 
follows focuses on such areas in which the decline in recharge dominates a possibly 
higher level of average annual rainfall. 
In addition to climate change, there are other reasons why the watershed may not 
be in a steady state condition. In some locales, logging is a source of livelihood for 
residents and the forest stock acts as a natural asset which can be quickly liquidated 
should the need arise. Events such as landslides, which cause catastrophic damage to 
delicate watershed ecosystems, naturally occur and climate change will likely increase 
the frequency of such occurrences. Watersheds are also constantly being threatened by 
new and existing invasive species. Invasive species alter existing land cover in otherwise 
balanced ecosystems, which results in increased runoff, decreased evapotranspiration, or 
both. Consequently, without watershed conservation, recharge decreases over time.  
  Declining recharge creates an even stronger case for investment in conservation 
capital. As depicted in Figure 4, climate change causes the recharge function to shift 
downward over time. Thus for a given level of capital stock ( 1 N ), the recharge rate is 
lower ( 2 1 R R < ). The excess burden of not properly managing the watershed is higher for 
more substantial declines in recharge. The intuition is that as water scarcity increases, so 
                                                 
12  Regional climate predictions made by global climate models are highly uncertain, however, inasmuch as 
local topography is not sufficiently characterized at the global scale. Recent attempts to design regional 
climate models using statistical downscaling techniques require further refinement but provide a step in the 
right direction. does the value of the marginal groundwater unit. Consequently, it is optimal to actually 
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opt R R < ). Figure 5 illustrates the result in terms of the 
MOC of groundwater. Since a higher capital stock is optimal for declining recharge, the 
downward shift of the MOC starting from the status quo is actually larger than the shift 
for the case of no climate change. Thus, the change in quantity consumed is also larger, 
although the absolute amount of total consumption is lower. 
 
Figure 4. Declining recharge resulting from climate change 
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Figure 5. Climate change increases excess burden of non-optimal watershed management 
 
5 Conclusion 
Ecosystems are a form of natural capital that produces a flow of benefits over 
time, much as natural resources do.  Valuing ecosystem services requires investigating 
many aspects of complex and intertwining systems, including but not limited to 
geophysical, ecological, and economic systems.  In this paper, we develop a methodology 
for valuing benefits to groundwater consumers resulting from optimal conservation of an 
up-gradient watershed.  Upon solving the dynamic optimization problem, we find that 
accounting for declining recharge capacity increases the marginal user cost and hence the 
efficiency price of groundwater.  At the same time, implementing a conservation project 
reduces the shadow price of groundwater.  The PV gain in consumer surplus created by 
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opt p  the groundwater price differential serves as a lower bound to the benefits of forest 
conservation.  Other non-measured values include, for example, recreation, biodiversity, 
and cultural values. 
  Since consumers receive the benefits from investment in maintaining the 
watershed, benefit taxation requires them to be responsible for the costs.  A lump-sum 
watershed conservation surcharge is transparent, as it requires each generation of users to 
pay a proportion of its benefit to fund watershed conservation.  Unlike a volumetric 
conservation surcharge in the public utilities context, whose purpose is to induce 
demand-side conservation in order to avoid capacity expansion costs, the efficient 
watershed conservation surcharges are lump-sum.   Inasmuch as investment in watershed 
conservation actually reduces the price of groundwater, a volumetric groundwater charge 
would induce inefficient consumption. 
Investment follows a most rapid approach path to the steady state, and much of 
the cost is concentrated in the initial periods of the program.  Accordingly, it is as if the 
government issues a bond to finance the conservation program, and the bond is paid off 
by future beneficiaries.  This may require enabling legislation for water utilities to change 
their principles of finance. In states such as Hawaii, the utility is allowed to finance the 
construction and maintenance of the infrastructure for groundwater extraction and 
delivery, but not for maintaining nature's infrastructure that recharges the aquifer. 
The theoretical framework developed is generally applicable to other instances of 
an upstream watershed providing ecosystem services to a downstream resource.  
Consider, for example, the case of hydroelectric power.  If the watershed is allowed to 
deteriorate, runoff increases as less permeable land-cover replaces the healthy forest system.  Increased runoff creates more sediment flow into the downstream reservoir, and 
consequently decreases the capacity of the reservoir over time.  The decline in reservoir 
capacity decreases the power generating capacity of the hydroelectric plant.  Therefore, a 
resource planner should invest in watershed conservation until, at the margin, the costs of 
investment are exactly equal to the benefits, which are measured as the value of 
electricity capacity saved by the reduction in sediment flow.  Assuming the utility 
generates its electricity primarily from the hydroelectric plant, a lump-sum tax system 
can be implemented to distribute watershed project costs in accordance with benefits 
obtained by electricity users. More generally, the framework can also be applied to other 
situations where resource management includes investment in the growth of a resource. 
Examples include fisheries, forest stands, and pastures for cattle grazing. 
  The analysis is a first step toward the optimal management of a groundwater 
aquifer and its associated watershed.  Many simplifying assumptions are made to 
facilitate clearer understanding of the model’s outcomes and resulting policy 
implications.  Consequently, many possible research extensions could improve on and 
extend the basic model.  Inasmuch as water balance, and hence groundwater infiltration, 
depends on many factors other than precipitation and forest stock, e.g. type of land cover, 
soil porosity, ground slope, the characterization of the state of the watershed should 
depend on vector of these factors in a real world application.  In addition, these factors 
also vary over space, which means that application of a spatial version of the model 
would require detailed information provided, for example, by GIS.  A more advanced 
framework might also take into account other flows of benefits generated by the 
watershed.  In addition to the consumption benefits of increased groundwater recharge, investment in watershed conservation also mitigates sedimentation, potentially increases 
biodiversity, and adds cultural value when reforestation is primarily native flora. 
Appendix A. Current Value Hamiltonian 
The corresponding Current Value Hamiltonian is: 
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= &  Appendix B. Comparative Statics 
Since the system is assumed to be in a steady state, time subscripts have been 
omitted to avoid notational clutter. Starting with Eq. 7, define the function G : 
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The assumptions about the leakage and extraction cost functions imply that  0 / < ∂ ∂ R G  
and  0 / > ∂ ∂ h G , resulting in inequality B2.  
  From Eq. A5 and result B2, it is straightforward that 
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